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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH 
CODEANN.(1996). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
For more than three years prior to the filing of this action, plaintiff suffered from 
breathing difficulties for which he sought medical treatment. At some point, plaintiff 
began to suspect that his problems were related to asbestos exposure, but his doctors 
informed him otherwise until 2002, shortly before he filed this action. The trial court held 
that because the plaintiff subjectively believed that his breathing problems were asbestos 
related, he knew or should have known that he was injured by the defendant's conduct, 
and his claims were time-barred. This holding raises two issues: 
(1) Was the trial court's ruling, which implicitly finds that the plaintiff subjectively 
believed he was suffering from an asbestos-related injury more than three years before he 
filed this action, supported by the record such that there was no material question of fact? 
(2) Generally, is a plaintiffs subjective belief that a defendant has harmed him 
enough to start the running of a statute of limitations, when the plaintiffs own doctors are 
advising him that his subjective beliefs are objectively unsupportable? 
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion for summary judgment raises only 
legal issues, which this court reviews for correctness. E.g., Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., 
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991); Winegarv. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 
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(Utah 1991). This court does not defer to the trial court's conclusion "that facts are 
undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported by those facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein 
& Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 
1996). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views the facts and all 
inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.; 
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales Kinglnt'l, Inc., 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 2000) (citations omitted). 
The court will affirm "'only if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the 
undisputed facts."5 Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289 (citation omitted). "[DJoubts about 
whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue of material fact should be resolved 
in favor of permitting the party to go to trial." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 107 
(Utah 1992). 
This issue was raised by the defendants in their motion for summary judgment (R. 
470-473), the memoranda and other papers filed by the parties in support of and in 
opposition to defendants' motion (R. 447-469), and at the hearing on the motion. (R.884) 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is determinative of the issue and provides as 
follows: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion [for summary 
judgment], memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in 
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as 
to the amount of damages. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below. 
This is an action brought pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) 
to recover for personal injuries (asbestosis) arising out of the plaintiffs exposure to 
asbestos. (R. 1-12) Although the plaintiff was not diagnosed with asbestosis until shortly 
before this case was filed, defendant Union Pacific Railroad filed a motion for summary 
judgment arguing, in part, that the plaintiffs claims were barred by the three year statute 
of limitations found in the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). (R. 447-469) 
The trial court granted Union Pacific's motion on the timeliness issue, basing its 
ruling on plaintiffs concession that he had been suffering from various pains in his chest 
for many years prior to his diagnosis, and on his testimony that subjectively, and 
notwithstanding what his own doctors were telling him, he believed his problems were 
asbestos-related. (R. 885-888) As the trial court stated it: 
[Pjlaintiff admits knowing he was severely injured, even before he quit 
working at his own roofing business in 1995. Moreover plaintiff admits 
subjectively believing asbestos was harmful and that his illness was caused 
by asbestos. (R. 887) 
The order dismissing Union Pacific Railroad Company was entered on July 6, 
2004. (R. 942-945) On September 20, 2004 this Court made a Minute Entry granting the 
Plaintiffs (unopposed) Rule 54(b) Motion to Enter Final Judgment as to Union Pacific 
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Railroad Company and to Certify as Ready for Appeal. (R. 977-979) This Court entered 
final judgment as to Union Pacific Railroad Company on October 18, 2004. (R. 985-986) 
B. Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff Carol Christiansen worked for the Union Pacific Railroad for one year, in 
1951, in both Wyoming and Idaho. (R. 563) He worked as a machinist and as a 
machinist's helper, and was involved primarily in re-building old steam engines. (R. 563, 
565) This work exposed him to asbestos both from the old parts he was removing and the 
new parts he was installing, which he often had to cut and manipulate to make them fit. 
(R. 563) The asbestos products he worked with included sheet asbestos used around the 
steam tanks in the locomotives, and asbestos mud which was used to coat firebricks and 
steam pipes. (R. 563, 572) The asbestos mud was delivered in a powder form that he 
was obliged to pour into a container and mix with water. (R. 573) Mr. Christiansen 
believes that his one year of work at Union Pacific exposed him to some of the most 
significant levels of asbestos that he encountered in his career. (R. 574) 
Mr. Christiansen began experiencing chest and back pains in the mid 1990s, 
around the time of his retirement, for which he immediately sought medical advice. (R. 
575-76) He informed the doctors that he had been exposed to asbestos, but was 
repeatedly tested for conditions not necessarily related to asbestos, and was treated with 
physical therapy or told he suffered from mere congestion. (R. 575-77) He underwent 
numerous CT scans and X-Rays, but was not advised that he had any asbestos related 
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condition until 2002, when Dr. Mary Scholand, a pulmonologist at the University of Utah, 
told him that she suspected he had asbestosis. (R.575, 579) 
Dr. Scholand was not the first pulmonologist plaintiff consulted. He had also 
previously met with one from St. Mark's hospital. (R. 582) The plaintiff told the St. 
Marks pulmonologist that he worked around asbestos, but the doctor affirmatively 
assured him that he was not suffering from asbestosis: 
Q. Okay. Do you think doctor Scholand was the first doctor to check for 
asbestosis? 
A. Yes. Well, I don't know. 
Q. Well, I know you don't know, but — 
A. There was one other one just before that. He was a lung doctor, but — 
Q. Do you remember his name, or where he was? 
A. He was in St. Marks hospital. 
Q. St. Marks. Okay. 
A. And I told him that I'd worked around asbestos, and he says, no, he said, it 
ain't asbestos. He says, it's just congestion. 
Q. Okay. (R. 582) 
Almost immediately after Dr. Scholand confirmed the asbestosis diagnosis, 
plaintiff sought counsel and retained them to pursue claims for his injuries. (R. 583) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence submitted in this case raised a question of material fact as to when 
plaintiff reasonably should have recognized the cause of his breathing problems, and the 
trial court erred in finding otherwise. Although the plaintiff was aware of his lung 
difficulties for several years before this action was filed, and eventually he suspected that 
they might be asbestos-related, there is no clear evidence when that suspicion arose. The 
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most unequivocal testimony in the record suggests this occurred less than three years 
before this action was filed. (R. 577) The trial court appears to have overlooked that 
testimony in basing its decision on plaintiffs subjective beliefs. 
Moreover, even if plaintiff subjectively believed that he suffered from an asbestos-
related condition more than three years before he filed suit, that alone is not enough for a 
finding that his claims were time barred. Plaintiffs medical doctors repeatedly told him 
that his lung condition was not related to asbestos. To require plaintiff to file an action in 
accord with his subjective beliefs despite the contrary conclusions of his own treating 
doctors creates a host of difficulties. It forces into the judicial system two classes of 
cases: those that lack merit and will never be supported by medical testimony, and those 
in which the plaintiffs hunch is correct but his condition has not yet developed to the 
point where doctors can diagnose it accurately. The first class of cases will increase the 
burden on the courts and defendants, to no benefit. The second class of cases will be 
filed before the plaintiff has competent evidence to support his or her claims, and as such 
they may be dismissed for all time. Then, when the plaintiffs doctors do find evidence of 
a latent disease at a later time, they are barred from seeking relief based on the doctrine of 
res judicata. In neither class of cases will the rule followed by the trial court prove to be 
beneficial. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS. 
The timeliness of suits brought under federal law against private defendants, or 
against the United States itself, are subject to equitable tolling principles. Irwin v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). Thus, for more than 50 years, FELA and other federal 
law cases have been governed by the discovery rule, whereby the statute of limitations 
does not begin to run until the injured worker becomes aware of the fact of his injury and 
its work-related cause. United States v. Kubrick 444 U.S. I l l , 122 (1979); Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 
1233,1238 (10th Cir. 2001); Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Dubose v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1984).1 
A. The Fact That Plaintiff Subjectively Believed That His Problems Were 
Asbestos Related Prior to a Medical Doctor's Diagnosis Was Not a 
Sufficient Basis for Summary Judgment Because the Record Is Not 
Clear About Whether That Subjective Belief Arose More than Three 
Years Before the Case Was Filed. 
The trial court expressly relied on plaintiffs subjective belief that his chest pain 
was related to asbestos, but the trial court did not state when this subjective belief 
indisputably arose, nor did it cite to the relevant testimony, and thus its reasoning is 
^ t ah law is similar: for example under Utah Code Section 78-14-4, "the term 
discovery of 'injur/ ... means discovery of injury and the negligence which resulted in the 
injury." Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980) (quoting Foil v. Bollinger, 
601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). 
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flawed. Even if a court could properly rely on a plaintiffs subjective belief to advance 
the beginning of a limitations period to some point before a doctor's diagnosis, in order to 
justify summary judgment the evidence has to show that the belief indisputably arose 
more than three years before the case was filed. Here, the evidence does not support that 
conclusion to any degree - much less does it leave no question of fact. While the plaintiff 
admitted suffering from chest pains for many years prior to filing this action, he did not 
testify that he immediately linked those pains to asbestos. Rather, he arrived at this 
subjective belief "a couple" years before his deposition was taken in 2003. 
Q. Did you ever see any advertisements that caused you to go look for a 
lawyer? 
A. No. Well, until here last year, year and a half, I didnft know ... that it 
was asbestos. I kind of, after they couldn't do nothing for me, then I got 
thinking maybe it was asbestos, in the last couple of years. 
Q. Was Dr. Scholand the first Doctor to tell you it was asbestos? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when did she tell you that? 
A. About a year ago. 
Q. So it was in 2002? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Can you tell me about what month? 
A. Well, first she didn't know for sure. She said she thought it was at first. 
And then she, I spent probably two months every few days going through 
tests and stuff. And finally she said it definitely was. 
Q. When do you think she told you it definitely was? 
A. About the time I called these people [my attorneys]. Maybe a little 
before that. (R. 579) 
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A "couple" is used by some to mean "several," but its more common meaning is a pair, or 
two. Of course, any doubts should have been resolved in favor of the plaintiff.2 
In light of this unclear testimony, summary judgment based on this ground was 
manifestly inappropriate. Indeed Union Pacific did not even assert below that plaintiffs 
subjective beliefs could be a basis for finding that the statute of limitations began running. 
The trial couifs reasoning was neither requested in, nor supported by the moving papers, 
and the resulting order and judgment should be reversed. 
B. Even If Plaintiff Arrived at a Subjective Belief That He Was Suffering from 
an Asbestos Related Condition More than Three Years Before Filing, That 
Subjective Belief Was Not Enough to Compel Him to Take Legal Action in 
Light of His Own Doctors' Advice to the Contrary. 
"A claim does not accrue when a person has a mere hunch, hint, suspicion, or 
rumor of a claim, but such suspicions do give rise to a duty to inquire into the possible 
existence of a claim in the exercise of due diligence." Kronisch v. United States, 150 
F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1998) (citingHobson v. Wilson, 111 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985)); see also Garza v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 
284 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 2002). "The assessment of whether a plaintiff has acted 
reasonably is an objective one " Garza, 284 F.3d at 935. 
2Plaintiff also testified that around the time of his retirement in 1995, he began to 
develop a belief that asbestos was causing medical problems, but it was not clear from the 
testimony whether he was speaking about his own problems or about the medical 
problems of some of his former co-workers. (R. 232-34) 
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Here, a "hunch, hint or suspicion," is all that plaintiff could have had regarding the 
cause of his chest pains prior to the time that he was diagnosed with asbestosis. When it 
comes to determining the link between chest pain such as that the plaintiff described, and 
any particular cause, only medical doctors are qualified to express informed judgments. 
The plaintiff may have claimed that he "knew" he was injured by asbestos before that 
diagnosis, but the simple truth is that he was not competent to make that conclusion. At 
most he could have believed in a causal relationship for which there was no firm 
empirical proof. Objectively viewed, the plaintiffs decision to take no legal action 
despite his personal beliefs was eminently reasonable, in light of what his doctors were 
telling him. 
The trial court's reliance on subjective belief leaves plaintiffs and their attorneys in 
a very difficult position and if left to stand, could have serious negative consequences for 
the judicial system and parties alike. If sick plaintiffs are expected to act on their 
subjective suspicions and beliefs as to the cause of their illnesses even when doctors say 
otherwise, two classes of cases will enter the courts. The first class of cases will be those 
that are totally without merit, and which would not have been filed if plaintiffs knew they 
were required to bring to court a firm medical diagnosis, and permitted to wait until they 
had one. Plaintiffs in these cases will approach their attorneys and state that they are 
firmly convinced that their illnesses were caused by the defendants' conduct, even if their 
doctors state otherwise. Their attorneys, fearing malpractice liability, will feel obliged to 
11 
file actions immediately, lest the claims become time-barred. However, without medical 
testimony, the claims will be dismissed, after significant costs and efforts are imposed on 
all parties and the courts. 
The second class of cases that will enter the courts are meritorious cases filed by 
persons whose latent diseases haven't yet developed enough for a firm medical diagnosis. 
The defendants will scream in protest, and file motions for summary judgment that 
probably will be granted. Most disturbingly, a summary judgment might, under the 
doctrine of res judicata, forever destroy the plaintiffs rights to compensation, even if the 
disease progresses to a point where the doctors reverse their conclusions and come to 
agree with the plaintiffs earlier beliefs. 
The importance of obtaining an informed medical diagnosis before being obliged 
to seek legal redress is so well-established that courts, applying both federal limitations 
law and state laws, have held repeatedly that even when a plaintiff believed or arguably 
should have believed he had a case, his claim could not accrue while his own doctors 
were rejecting his conclusion. The principle has been applied by no less than four federal 
Courts of Appeal, as well as at least one District Court. 
The Court of Appeals in Young v. Clinchfield Railroad Co., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961), 
faced a FELA claim for silicosis. The plaintiff worked on a rig that traveled along train tracks, 
repairing ties, and in the process it removed and crashed the rocks in between the rails, creating 
silica dust. More than three years before he filed suit, the plaintiff had breathing difficulties, but 
his doctors first suspected Tuberculosis and did not diagnose silicosis until shortly before he sued. 
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Nevertheless, the railroad argued that as a resident of the West Virginia mining region, plaintiff 
must have known immediately that his breathing problems were from silica injuries. The court 
rejected the assertion that the plaintiff laborer was qualified to diagnose the cause of his own 
breathing difficulties: 
Residence in the mining country of West Virginia does not invest one with the 
expert knowledge or diagnostic skill sought to be attributed to the plaintiff. The 
sought for inference could rest on nothing more than speculation. In spite of 
frequent sojourns in the hospital where the plaintiff was many times given 
complete physical examinations, it is noteworthy that not the slightest intimation 
is found in the record that silicosis was even suspected by any physician who 
examined him before August, 1956. Moreover, when the plaintiff was X-rayed as 
late as June, 1956, the physician who read the negative thought that the plaintiff 
might be suffering from tuberculosis. Not until August of that year, after 
exhaustive medical tests, did this physician, a specialist in respiratory diseases, 
diagnose silicosis. A medical judgment that eluded the specialist cannot 
reasonably be expected from the plaintiff 
288 F.2d at 503-04 (emphasis added). 
^Aerojet-GeneralShipyards, Inc. v. O'Keeffe, 413 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1969), the 
shipyard employee filed a claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act - the maritime equivalent of the FELA. In pertinent part, he made a claim for lung fibrosis 
related to his work as a sandblaster. Although he experienced breathing difficulties in 1964 and 
attributed them to his work, his doctors did not agree with his self diagnosis until 1966, after 
which he promptly filed a claim. The employer disputed liability and claimed that the claim was 
barred by the statute's one year limitations period. The Court of Appeals disagreed: 
We are convinced that the employee filed his application well within the one-year 
statutory period. The Company contends, however, that Lee had experienced 
breathing difficulties and arthritic pains periodically since 1964. The record does 
indicate that Lee was aware of symptoms of his work-related diseases as early as 
1964 and that he thought perhaps they might be caused or related to his working 
conditions. What the Company neglects to consider is that several doctors 
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expressly rejected Lee's layman self-diagnosis and concluded that his problems 
were not work related. The first diagnosis linking Lee's breathing difficulties and 
arthritis with his working conditions occurred in January 1966, and the claim for 
compensation followed shortly thereafter. The limitations period for occupational 
diseases begins to run when the employee knows, or reasonably should know, that 
his condition is a disease which arose out of his employment. [Citation] [A] 
claim for occupational disease accrues only when the 'cumulative effects of 
exposure manifest themselves1. [Citation] The effects must manifest themselves 
to a physician rather than to an unschooled employee before limitations begin to 
run. This analysis effectuates the policy that the Act is to be liberally construed in 
a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results. [Citation] 
413 F.2d at 795-76 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Harrison v. United States, 708 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1983), the plaintiff wife 
of a military officer sought treatment for headaches at the Wilford Hall Hospital at Lackland Air 
Force Base in Texas, in 1966. She underwent several tests including procedures which entailed 
injecting her skull and spine with air, to perform x-rays. The tests failed to detect the cause of 
her headaches, and she developed other neurological and memory problems afterward. Many 
years passed and plaintiff sought care from a number of doctors, none of whom could ascertain 
the cause of her condition. The plaintiff eventually became convinced that a number of her 
problems were caused by damage to her brain suffered during the 1966 tests, but her doctors did 
not share her belief. Then, the plaintiff retained an attorney who sought records from the 1966 
tests. After being given the runaround for years by military officers in both Texas and 
Washington, the attorney finally received the records, and they showed that during the tests a 
needle accidentally pierced the thalmus portion of the plaintiffs brain. The scar tissue that 
would form thereafter was a plausible cause of her difficulties. She filed her claim shortly 
thereafter. 
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The United States argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff s claim was untimely because she 
herself believed for years that she had been harmed during the 1966 tests. The District Court 
accepted this argument and dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeal reversed, making a 
distinction between a plaintiffs belief dead actual knowledge. 
In assessing the awareness required to trigger the statute of limitations, it is 
essential to distinguish between "knowledge" and "belief." For one to have 
knowledge of fact "x," three requisites must exist: (1) "x" must be true, (2) the 
person must believe "x" to be true, and (3) the belief must be reasonably based. 
A. Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (1979); A. Quinton, "Knowledge and 
Belief," Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967). "Belief," which is a component of 
knowledge, requires only requisites (1) and (2)--"x" must be true and the person 
must believe it to be true. As a consequence, conclusions based on dreams, 
intuitions, suspicion, conjecture, ESP, speculation, or faulty reasoning, even if 
true, are merely "belief." Absent a reasonable basis, these conclusions do not 
rise to the level of "knowledge." 
Prior to July 1976, Harrison had only a belief. She could not know the 
basis for her injury. The myriad medical and legal experts could not express a 
reasoned opinion that the cause of her impairment was an error in the medical 
procedures conducted at Wilford Hall. They could not relate causally her 
difficulties and Wilford Hall. It is not reasonable to suggest that before gaining 
access to her records Harrison possessed the requisite knowledge of the cause of 
her condition when doctors who knew immeasurably more than her were stymied 
and freely admitted their bewilderment. It would be unreasonable to hold 
Harrison to a higher degree of medical competence and understanding than the 
many medical experts she consulted. 
Harrison's suspicion or belief that her problems dated from Wilford Hall was 
merely one of a series of explanations that she seized upon in anguish and 
desperation to explain her illness. Her privately conceived notions did not 
become knowledge until July 1976 when she received copies of her medical 
records. Only then was she in a position to know that her difficulties were 
caused by a slip in the procedures at Wilford Hall. See Aerojet-General 
Shipyards, Inc. v. O'Keeffe, 413 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.1969). 
708 F.2d at 1027-28 (emphasis added). 
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In Dubose v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., supra, the Fifth Circuit said: 
When a plaintiff may be charged with awareness that his injury is connected to 
some cause should depend on factors including how many possible causes exist 
and whether medical advice suggests an erroneous causal connection or 
otherwise lays to rest a plaintiff fs suspicion regarding what caused his injury. 
729F.2datl031. 
In Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980), an employee of a 
munitions plant operated for the United States began experiencing angina attacks on 
weekends, and eventually suffered a full-blown heart attack. She suspected for more than 
two years before she filed her federal claim that the attacks were related to withdrawal 
from her weekday exposures to nitroglycerin from the munitions and rocket propellants that 
she handled. However, both her private physicians and the plant physician advised her that there 
was no medical basis for that conclusion. Even after she read a union newspaper article that 
suggested a link between nitroglycerin exposure and heart problems, and even after a 
state safety inspector said he shared her beliefs, her doctors continued to tell her there was 
no link. Finally, a scientific study found a link between exposure to nitroglycerin and 
withdrawal-related heart attacks, and she brought a negligence claim against the United 
States within two years thereafter. The United States asserted a limitations defense, and 
the federal trial court ruled that most of the plaintiffs claims were time-barred, but the 
Court of Appeals reversed, writing in part: 
The Government contends Mrs. Stoleson's suspicion that nitroglycerin was 
the culprit is sufficient knowledge of causation to trigger the statute of 
limitations. We disagree. A laymanfs subjective belief, regardless of its 
sincerity or ultimate vindication, is patently inadequate to go to the trier of 
fact Therefore, had Mrs. Stoleson sought competent legal advice, she 
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would have been informed quite correctly that she had no claim against the 
Government. 
629 F.2d at 1270 (emphasis added).3 
The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Maughan v. SW Servicing, 
Inc., 758 F.2d 1381 (10th Cir. 1985), applied Utah law in much the same way that the 
previous decisions applied federal law. The plaintiffs' claims were for leukemia suffered 
by their decedents, allegedly as a result of pollution from a uranium mill located in their 
town. The cases were filed far more than two years after each of the deaths. The court 
recognized that under Utah law, the date of discovery rule for statutes of limitations 
calculations was applicable only in three situations: when required by statute, when the 
defendant has concealed facts or misled the plaintiff, or when there are exceptional 
circumstances requiring tolling. 758 F.2d at 1384. The question before the court was 
whether "exceptional circumstances" were presented by the fact that the plaintiffs 
injuries were cancers that allegedly were the latent effects of chemical exposure. The 
court ruled that they were: 
Because of the complexity of the scientific data concerning causation of 
cancer, the disparity of knowledge between plaintiffs and potential 
3The Stoleson court indicated that the statute of limitations would not have been 
tolled if the advice she was receiving from her doctors was incompetent or otherwise 
mistaken based on the current state of medical knowledge at the time, because the 
defendant should not be punished for the fault of others, Id. n. 5, but that is not a 
distinction relevant here. There is no evidence that the advice received by Mr. 
Christiansen was incompetent or mistaken: it may be that evidence of his asbestos disease 
was not detectable until his asbestosis diagnosis was made. 
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defendants, and the often long latency period of the disease, this court 
concludes that cases involving suspected carcinogens present "exceptional 
circumstances" justifying application of the discovery rule. 
758F.2datl385. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals warned against application of a limitations rule that 
immediately obliged plaintiffs to file actions on the mere suspicion that their cancers were 
related to some toxic chemical or substance, because to do so might encourage frivolous 
filings that would burden courts and defendants alike: 
To adopt a rule that encourages the filing of lawsuits when one develops 
cancer but has no knowledge of its cause, or which of several possible 
causes, "is not consistent with the unarguably sound proposition that 
unfounded claims should be strongly discouraged." Foil, 601 P.2d at 148. 
In this time of crowded dockets, it is pure folly to suggest that the plaintiffs 
should file suit against all sources of suspected carcinogens, with the 
attendant economic and social costs, simply to prevent the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
758F.2datl386. 
Most relevant here is the Court of Appeals' distinction, like that made in Harrison, 
between knowledge of the existence of a claim, and a mere suspicion: 
The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows or 
should know of the facts constituting the cause of action, [citations], 
including the fact of causation. There is a substantive difference between 
knowledge of causation and mere suspicion, [citations] The statute cannot 
start running when the plaintiff merely knows or should know that there is a 
suspected link between a particular substance and cancer in general. **** 
A rule that the statute begins to run as soon as a plaintiff becomes aware 
that a particular substance is suspected to cause cancer in some people 
would be absurd, for it would force the plaintiff to file suit against all 
suspected sources of carcinogens simply to prevent the statute from 
running. A plaintiff who did so, without further support for the allegation 
18 
that a particular carcinogen caused his cancer, would be susceptible to 
dismissal on grounds of frivolity. 
758F.2datl387. 
Applying those principles to the facts of the case before it, the Court of A.ppeals 
held that the summary judgment was improper. In part, the Court based this holding on 
the fact that the plaintiffs were told by several sources (other than the defendants) that 
leukemia could not be caused by the defendant's mill: 
Relevant factors to be considered include the undisputed fact that several of 
the plaintiffs in this case did ask their doctors what had caused the 
leukemia, and all were told that the cause was unknown, [citations] 
Neither the local doctors nor the doctors consulted in Salt Lake City made 
the correlation between the leukemia and the uranium mill, [citations] In 
addition, the government studies that were produced explicitly reassured the 
plaintiffs who were aware of them that there was no connection between the 
mill and the cases of leukemia and that the radiation levels in Monticello 
were normal, [citations] These factors may affect when a reasonably 
diligent plaintiff would have been put on notice to investigate, and whether 
he then would have discovered the cause of action. 
758F.2datl389. 
The final federal decision in this line of cases was Loughlin v. United States, 230 
F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2002). The plaintiffs purchased a home on property that was once 
used by the United States for chemical weapons and agricultural chemical research. For 
many years there were reports and findings of contamination on neighboring property 
during construction work or otherwise, but nothing concrete with respect to the plaintiffs 
own property. The plaintiffs had been aware of one report written many years before they 
filed suit, which identified the presence of a chemical that was hazardous only to aquatic 
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life. They also hired a testing laboratory of their own to confirm that their land was safe. 
The consequent report identified no dangerous levels of any hazardous substance. In the 
face of a claim by the defendant United States that the plaintiffs knew or should have 
know if the existence of the claims even before that second report was received, the 
federal District Court responded: 
In the face of these findings by two independent expert testing 
organizations that no hazardous substances had been found on the land, the 
government cannot seriously assert that the Loughlins had knowledge of an 
injury at this stage. 
230F.Supp.2dat42. 
The most recent on-point decision was rendered three months ago by the Oregon 
Court of Appeals, applying that state's law in an asbestos case similar to the one at hand. 
Keller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 107 P.3d 29 (Or. App. 2005). From the 
early 1960s, Mr. Keller worked in various jobs involving mufflers and exhaust systems. 
He was exposed to the fumes from vehicles, and also was a smoker. Because mufflers 
often were made with asbestos cloth, he also was exposed to asbestos dust, both during 
the time he worked for a muffler manufacturer, and when he removed old, crumbling 
mufflers in order to replace them. Beginning in the early 1980s Mr. Keller experienced 
breathing difficulties, but each time he visited the doctors they concluded that his 
problems could not be firmly attributed to asbestos exposure or disease. The first 
pulmonologist that he visited, in 1986, saw no evidence of asbestos in his lungs but said 
that asbestos "might be" the cause of his problems. Id. at 31. 
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He saw another doctor in 1991 who said his problems "possibly" were related to 
asbestos. Id. That doctor filed a statement in support of an application for social security 
disability benefits filed later that year, confirming Keller suffered from pulmonary 
fibrosis but not stating the cause. Keller himself stated on the application that the cause 
of his lung problems were exhaust fumes, dust, and asbestos. The record did not disclose 
the results of the application. 
Through the balance of the 1990s, the plaintiff continued to receive equivocal and 
inconsistent diagnoses of his ailments. In 1995 he applied for workers compensation 
benefits alleging injury from asbestos exposures, but the employer's examining doctor 
found no asbestos causation for his injuries, concluding, "I believe his case can be closed 
in that he has no asbestos related condition." Id. at 33. Keller's own doctors were asked 
to review this report and signed statements that they agreed with it. 
Finally, in 2000, a physician examined Keller's radiology and test reports and 
diagnosed lung disease that, based on his work history, most likely resulted from asbestos. 
The action was filed later that year. Based on the plaintiffs history of breathing difficulty 
and his own suspicions that it was related to asbestos, the trial court granted the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. However 
the Court of Appeal reversed: 
Based on the record in this case, we conclude that a factual dispute exists 
about whether plaintiff actually discovered the cause of his disease before 
1998 and about whether a person exercising reasonable care would have 
discovered that cause before 1998. We agree with plaintiff that the facts 
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available to him simply do not establish, as a matter of law, that he 
discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, before 1998 that there 
was a considerable degree of certainty that his symptoms were caused by 
asbestos. On the contrary, his treating doctors consistently expressed 
uncertainty about the nature of his condition and identified several possible 
causes. 
Id. at 37. 
The Oregon appellate court likened the facts before it to the more settled line of 
cases which hold that the defendant's fraud may toll the statute of limitations: 
In this case, plaintiffs doctors consistently expressed uncertainty about the 
cause of his disease and gave him several alternative explanations for his 
symptoms. In that respect, this case is similar to those malpractice and 
products liability cases in which courts have held that statutes of limitation 
did not begin to run where plaintiffs received reassurances from defendants 
that prevented plaintiffs from having sufficient certainty about the existence 
of facts pertaining to the elements of the statutes of limitation. 
Of course, in this case, the alternative explanations were not 
presented with the intent of hiding a tortfeasor's wrongdoing or liability. 
That intent is not important, however; the effect of an awareness of the 
existence of alternative explanations on a reasonable person is. Where, as 
here, a plaintiffs doctors consistently express uncertainty about the cause of 
disease and present him or her with a number of equally plausible factual 
explanations for his or her disease, that may preclude the conclusion that he 
or she knew, or should have known, as a matter of law, that one of those 
explanations was sufficiently correct to trigger the statute of limitations. 
Id. at 37-38. 
The plaintiff here investigated the source of his illness diligently and specifically 
asked his doctors whether it might be causally linked to asbestos. He was told there was 
no link, and under those circumstances it is impossible to conclude that he slept on his 
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rights, such that the statute of limitations should run against him. See Burnett v. New 
York CentralR. Co., 380 U.S. 424,429 (1965). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Carol Christiansen presented competent evidence that he reasonably 
relied on the advise of his doctors in not filing claims for asbestos injury until 2002, when 
a doctor advised for the first time that his breathing problems were related to asbestos 
exposure. This created a factual issue as to whether Mr. Christiansen knew or reasonably 
should have known what the cause of his breathing problems were. This Court should 
reverse the judgment below and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this / V ^ d a y of June, 2005. 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
S. BROOK MILLARD 
C. RYAN CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL CHRISTIANSEN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
ANCHOR PACKING COMPANY, et 
al., 
Defendants, 
ORDER DISMISSING UNION PACIFIC 
RAILROAD COMPANY 
Case No. 0209000216 
Master Case No. 010900863 AS 
Judge Glenn K. IwasaH 
Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion For Summary Judgment came 
before the Court for argument on April 23,2004. Plaintiff was represented by S. Brook Millard, 
and defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company was represented by Casey K. McGarvey. The 
Court having reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties, having heard the positions and 
argument of counsel, and having entered its Memorandum Decision on April 29,2004, and for 
good cause shown, now hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that defendant Union Pacific Railroad 
Company's motion is granted, and that plaintiffs complaint as to Union Pacific Railroad 
97 
Company and all the alternative entities set forth in the master complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice, and on the merits, -with costs to be awarded to Union Pacific Railroad Company as the 
prevailing party, as allowed by law. 
lis (t? day of *r?& DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BRAYTONPURCELL 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
S. Brook Millard 
900 Parkside Office Towsr 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4- 2004. 
BY THE 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
District Court Judge 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1st day of July, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
-within and foregoing ORDER DISMISSING UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY to be 
e-mailed or mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
BRAYTON •PURCELL 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
S. Brook Millard 
900 Parkside Office Tower 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
r^christ@bravtonlaw. com 
DUNN&DUNN 
Timothy D. Dunn 
Susan Black Dunn sblack@diinndunn.com 
230 South 500 Fast #460 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
STRONG &HANNI 
Joseph J. Joyce 
600 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
SaltLakeCity,Utah 84111 
asbestog@strongandhanniconi 
CHR1STENSEN" & JENSEN, F.C. 
Phillip S. Ferguson 
Rebecca L* Hill 
50 South Main Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
asbestasfi&chrisierLcom 
BAKER & HOSTELLER, LLP 
Mary Price Birk Mbirk@baksr-hoststlsr.corci 
Ranald L» Hellbusch Rhellbnsch@baksrla-w.coin 
303 East 17th Avenue, Suite 1100 
Denver, Colorado 80203 
RAY, QU1NNEY & NEBEKER 
Rick L. Rose rrose@ran.com 
Justin Toth 
Greg Roberts 
PO Box 453 85 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-03S3 
Todd S, Winegar 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
toddwinsgar@azbar.org 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Patricia W, Christensen pwc@pwlaw.com 
185 South State Street, Ste 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1537 
MCCONNELL SIDERTUS FLEISCHNER 
HOUGHTALING & CRA2GMILE 
James M* Mfletich imiletich@msfhc.com 
2401 - 15th Street, Suite 300 
Denver, CO 80202 
SNELL & W3LMER LLP 
Tracy Fowler tFowler@swlaw.com 
Todd Shaughnessy tshauehnessvfSjswlawxom 
Dan R. Larsen, Bryon L Bene^ento 
15 West South Temple, Ste 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
SaltLake City, Utah 84101-1004 
JOKES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Ross 1. Romero rrQmsro@ioneswaldo.com 
George Pratt 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
SaltLake City, Utah 84101 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Melinda A. Morgan Mam@rbmn.com 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
RO Box 2465 
SaltLake City, Utah 84110-2465 
on 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &. MART1NEAU 
John E. Lund Asbestos@scmkw com 
10 Exchange Place Suite 1100 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145 
Barbara K. Berrett bbEn-stt@berr6ttandassoc.com 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
50 S. Main Street #530 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
JAM p A sJL^J!/) 
™ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL CHRISTIANSEN, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
ANCHOR PACKING COMPANY, e t a l . ; 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 0209000216 
Honorab l e GLENN K. IWASAKI 
A p r i l 26 , 2 0 0 f : I L E D D , S T R | C T C 0 U R T 
Third Judicial District 
~m 2 9 2004 
\ ' ^ W E COUNTVN 
Deputy Clerk 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court 
heard oral argument with respect to the motion on April 23, 2004. 
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion^ memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Plaintiff in this action worked as a laborer in a tunnel, as 
a machine operator on the railroad line} and as an assistant 
machinist in and around a repair facility. During this 
employment, plaintiff alleges he was exposed to asbestos. As a 
result of this alleged exposure, plaintiff contends he contracted 
diseases attributable to asbestos. 
With its motion for summary judgment, Union Pacific alleges 
plaintiff cannot prove the levels of exposure at the relevant 
CHRISTIANSEN v. ANCHOR PACKING MEMORANDUM DECISION 
times of any alleged exposure and he cannot prove even possible 
exposure reasonably considered to be unsafe at the time. 
Moreover, argues defendant, there is no evidence plaintiff ever 
was on any operating locomotive when it was in use on line and 
that he was then exposed to asbestos because of a defect.1 
Finally, it is defendant's position that even if plaintiff could 
prove negligence, his claims are time barred as he admits his 
injuries were manifest before 1995. Specifically, asserts 
defendant, the FELA requires an action thereon to be commenced 
within three years from when an injury is first manifest and this 
action was not commenced until 2002. 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing Union Pacific was aware 
of the dangers of asbestos well before plaintiff was employed by 
it and Union Pacific negligently caused plaintiff to be exposed 
to excessive levels of asbestos, despite knowing it could cause 
significant bodily harm. Moreover, argues plaintiff, Mr. 
Christiansen was not diagnosed with an asbestos related health 
problem until he met with a pulmonologist in 2002. According to 
plaintiff, it was at this time that his condition was diagnosed 
as asbestos related and the statute of limitations began to 
*During oral argument plaintiff conceded this point. 
Accordingly, Defendant Union Pacific's Motion is granted in this 
regard. 
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acc rue . 
After reviewing the record in this matter, and viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the 
Court is persuaded plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to 
create a duty and show a breach of that duty. This said, 
howeverr the Court further finds the action to be time barred. 
Indeed, claims for exposure accrue when "the accumulated effects 
of the deleterious substance manifest themselves." In Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949). In the instant, plaintiff 
admits knowing he was severely injured, even before he quit 
working at his own roofing business in 1995. Moreover plaintiff 
admits subjectively believing asbestos was harmful and that his 
illness was caused by asbestos. Under any reading of these 
facts, plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of both his 
injury and its cause by the mid-1990's. Accordingly, Defendant 
Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
DATED this ^ s day of April, 2004 . 
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